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The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards 
Nicola Faith Sharpe† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay tackles a pervasive misperception on the part of regula-
tors that director independence significantly increases the efficacy of 
corporate boards. In this Essay, I assert that such “cosmetic indepen-
dence” is not enough to remedy the corporate failures of recent years. 
Cosmetic independence is independence that takes into account only a 
corporate director’s relationship with the corporation and not the tools a 
director needs to achieve substantive independence. These tools include 
time, information, and knowledge, all of which have been recognized as 
critical to effective decision-making processes in organizational behavior 
literature. 
This Essay is critical of regulatory reforms intended to improve 
board monitoring. Regulators have consistently responded to each new 
wave of corporate failure by requiring greater board independence with-
out much regard to the organizational process necessary for boards to 
function effectively. These regulations are designed to enhance board 
performance by changing the composition and structure of the board 
through increasing the number of directors that meet a superficial defini-
tion of independence and creating a more detailed and independent 
committee structure.1 The changes assume that stricter definitions of di-
                                                            
† Assistant Professor of Law and Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Scholar, University of Illinois 
College of Law. J.D., Yale University; M.B.A., Yale University; B.A., Cornell University. Email: 
nsharpe@law.illinois.edu. ©2011 Nicola Faith Sharpe. I am grateful for the comments of or discus-
sions with the following individuals: Jena Martin Amerson, Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Margareth 
Etienne, Larry E. Ribstein, Jamelle C. Sharpe, Suja A. Thomas, and Cynthia A. Williams. I would 
also like to thank the participants in the Seattle University School of Law, Second Annual Sympo-
sium of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society and the participants in the 
Annual Meeting of the Society of Socio-Economists cosponsored by the Law and Economics Center 
at Boalt Hall School of Law for their comments and suggestions. All mistakes, of course, are my 
own. Special thanks to Dominique Carroll and Carly Giffin for their research assistance. 
 1. Implicit in the critique of who should be on the board of directors is a criticism about how 
boards can be better monitors. The solutions that increase cosmetic board independence operate by 
changing the composition and the structure of the board. See discussion infra notes 36–53 and ac-
companying text. For a more in-depth discussion of why compositional and structural changes are 
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rector independence necessarily lead to boards more effectively monitor-
ing corporate management. There are numerous, well-known examples 
of this shift toward increasing director independence, which started in the 
1970s2 and has continued through major legislative overhauls such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.3 Examples include changes in stock-exchange list-
ing standards post-Enron, the federal government’s involvement in cor-
porate boards following the 2008 financial crisis,4 and most recently, 
several of the corporate governance provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.5 
These reforms have implemented little more than a cosmetic inde-
pendence, which is both static and decontextualized. Cosmetic indepen-
dence does not provide the board with the substantive components that 
are necessary for successful, informed decision-making and form the 
foundation of the board’s monitoring role.6 I therefore challenge the con-
ventional wisdom that increasing director independence, by itself, can 
meaningfully reduce agency costs or the likelihood of repeated corporate 
failure when a substantive approach to selecting directors is needed. I 
submit that we should be skeptical of cosmetic independence as the prin-
cipal criteria for board membership. In order to reduce managerial influ-
ence in the boardroom, the basis on which directors are selected must be 
broadened to include time, information, and knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                     
inadequate, see Nicola Faith Sharpe, Improving Corporate Board Process Through Organizational 
Behavior, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 2. See discussion infra notes 36–53 and accompanying text. 
 3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in portions of 11, 
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 4. See, e.g., Nicola Faith Sharpe, Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 99 (2010) (examining the government’s response to the 2008 financial 
crisis in the context of the corporate board of directors and its potential impact on corporate gover-
nance reforms). 
 5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). For a discussion of § 10C that prohibits listing securities of issuers that do not 
have an independent compensation committee, see discussion infra notes 49–50 and accompanying 
text. In addition to § 10C, at least two parts of the Act emphasize the importance of independence. 
One provision increases shareholder access to the proxy ballot. Pursuant to the Act, the SEC adopted 
New Exchange Act Rule 14a-11, which mandates that shareholders who own at least three percent of 
a company’s stock for three years are entitled to nominate a candidate for a directorship and have her 
nomination included in the company’s proxy materials. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, S7-10-09, FACILITATING SHAREHOLDER DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS (Aug. 25, 2010), avail-
able at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf. The Act also specifies that in accordance with 
SEC rulemaking, a corporation will have to disclose why it either combines or separates the offices 
of board chairperson and CEO in its annual proxy statement. Dodd-Frank Act, § 972, 124 Stat. at 
1915 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n–2). 
 6. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). Many scholars 
interpret Caremark as setting forth an affirmative monitoring obligation for directors and consider 
Caremark as the modern foundation for the board’s good-faith obligation to monitor the corporation. 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith In Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 62-63 
(2006); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 720 (2007). 
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A more useful method of identifying the characteristics of a suc-
cessful board can be found in organizational behavior literature.7 This 
literature examines the attributes of successful teams, many of which 
have attributes that are applicable to the board of directors. Adopting its 
insights about high-performing teams leads to the conclusion that it is the 
critical components of good decision-making, which include knowledge, 
time, and information, that lead to effective team performance. These 
attributes go beyond cosmetic independence and help fill in the gaps left 
by the conventional regulatory approach. In this regard, an organizational 
behavior approach is consistent with the tenets of agency theory but, as 
compared to conventional prescriptions for board reform, it takes a dee-
per look at the factors that enable corporate boards to make sound deci-
sions. Using these factors to identify strong candidates for board mem-
bership does not require that we eliminate independence as a criterion for 
board membership; it means that we must recognize that independence 
without the underlying attributes of time, information, and knowledge is 
not enough. 
In addition to identifying independent directors as the ideal and the 
largely exclusive who to fulfill the monitoring responsibilities of the 
board,8 regulatory reforms have invested tremendous effort in refining 
the definition of independence as how to improve board function.9 This 
cosmetic definition of independence actually reduces the likelihood that 
                                                            
 7. Organizational behavior theory studies how individuals and groups function within organi-
zations. Models based on this contextualized organizational behavior approach attempt to examine 
the organization as a whole, rather than reducing it to smaller, isolated parts. GREGORY B. 
NORTHCRAFT & MARGARET ANN NEALE, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGE 26 (1990) “[Organizational behavior] is the confluence of individual, group, and orga-
nizational studies flowing from industrial—organizational psychology and organization and man-
agement theory with headwaters in psychology (social, psychometrics), sociology (organizational, 
work, occupational), and management (scientific, human relations).” Id.; Benjamin Schneider, Or-
ganizational Behavior, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 573, 574 (1985). See Chip Heath & Sim B. Sitkin, 
Big-B Versus Big-O: What Is Organizational About Organizational Behavior?, 22 J. ORG. BEHAV. 
43, 44, 51 (2001) (“Organizational behavior differs from related fields [psychology, sociology, polit-
ical science, anthropology] in its focus not just on individual or group behavior, but specifically on 
individual and group behavior in organizations.”).  
 8. Irwin Borowski, Corporate Accountability: The Role of the Independent Director, 9 J. CORP. 
L. 455, 459, 469 n.15 (1984); see Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA 
L. REV. 127, 137–38 (2010); James D. Westphal, Collaboration in the Board Room: Behavioral and 
Performance Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 8 (1999). 
 9. Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: 
Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 102 (1985) (“Pro-
posals for corporate board reform devote special attention to the issues of board composition and 
director independence.”); Fairfax, supra note 8, at 138 (“The principle corporate-governance re-
sponse to the agency problem has been the independent director.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. 
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 1, 11 (2002) (“One of the favorite projects of corporate reformers has been the creation of 
the so-called ‘monitoring’ board.”). 
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independent directors will be able to act independently of the Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer (CEO). The primary reasons for this reduction are that 
independent directors are outsiders unaffiliated with the company and 
hence they frequently lack the time, information, and knowledge to prop-
erly monitor the CEO and other top-level management.10 Provisions must 
be made to consistently account for these elements before we can rea-
sonably expect corporate boards to succeed because regulatory reforms 
influence the characteristics of the board, which in turn directly impact 
how the board operates. 
I have argue elsewhere that board characteristics, like structure and 
composition, directly impact and constrain process, which is how boards 
engage in monitoring management.11 The process of how boards monitor 
should be more of a focus of corporate reforms than simply who sits on 
the boards.12 This Essay argues that adopting cosmetic independence as 
the ideal who of directorships is misguided. There are more substantive 
characteristics that would lead to better decision-making and reduced 
                                                            
 10. The term “independent director” does not have a uniform meaning or consistent legal defi-
nition in corporate and securities law. See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 133 (noting that although there is 
no “uniform definition” of an independent director, the definitions uniformly exclude “‘inside direc-
tors’–directors who are currently employed by the corporation on whose board they serve.”). For 
some of the meanings used in the securities context, see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j-1(m)(3)(B) (2006) (excluding from the definition of “independent director” anyone who rece-
ives compensation from the corporation). Similarly, both the NYSE and NASDAQ exclude from the 
definition of “independent” any director who receives compensation from the corporation other than 
her director fees. Specifically, the NYSE rules exclude from the independence definition anyone 
who received, “during any twelve-month period within the last three years, more than $120,000 in 
direct compensation from the listed company” (other than compensation related to director service). 
NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02(b)(ii) (2010) [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL], available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm. NASDAQ listing rules also exclude direc-
tors who receive any non-fee-related or retirement related compensation “in excess of $120,000 
during any period of twelve consecutive months within the three years preceding the determination 
of independence.” NASDAQ, THE QUALIFICATION, LISTING AND DELISTING OF COMPANIES, RULE 
IM-5605(a)(B) (2010) [hereinafter NASDAQ QUALIFICATION], available at 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com. The NYSE rules also exclude any director that is employed with “a 
company that has made payments to, or received payments from, the listed company . . . in any of 
the last three fiscal years [that] exceeds the greater of $1 million or 2% of such company’s consoli-
dated gross revenues.” NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra, § 303A.02(b)(v). NASDAQ has a 
similar rule. Generally, a director is not considered independent if she is currently a partner, control-
ling shareholder, or executive officer of a company that receives or has received payments from the 
corporation on whose board the director sits in “the current or any of the past three fiscal years” in 
excess of the greater of 5% of the receiving company’s gross revenues or $200,000. NASDAQ 
QUALIFICATION, supra, 5605(a)(D). In contrast to the securities laws and listing standards, Delaware 
courts offer a contextual definition of independence. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 134 (discussing the 
Delaware courts’ definition of independence, which distinguishes “between a ‘disinterested director’ 
and an ‘independent director’”). As a result, outsider status is a necessary but insufficient characte-
ristic of independence. Id. 
 11. See Sharpe, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. 
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managerial influence over directors: time, information, and knowledge. 
Moreover, cosmetic independence negatively impacts how boards are 
able to monitor managers because directors who are not employed with 
the company face a significant time, information, and knowledge deficit, 
which reduces the efficacy of their decision-making and monitoring. 
The aim of the Essay is two-fold. First, like other critics of inde-
pendent directors, it highlights the inadequacies inherent in the current 
definition of independence in corporate governance reforms. By identify-
ing better criteria for board membership and better processes for board 
decision-making, the Essay suggests that these attributes are more accu-
rate indicators of an effective board than cosmetic independence. 
Second, the Essay goes beyond the frequently discussed flaws of inde-
pendence and suggests that the attention paid to the independent direc-
tor/inside director distinction is misplaced.13 Instead, the Essay encou-
rages scholars to turn to the organizational behavior literature on group 
decision-making to identify the attributes of effective teams, which in-
clude time, information, and knowledge. The Essay argues that these 
three attributes should be the driving force behind director selection, not 
cosmetic independence. While understanding and reforming the corpo-
rate board of directors is a complex undertaking, this Essay concludes 
that scholars should nevertheless fully engage with that complexity by 
questioning the assumptions underlying cosmetic independence. 
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I argues that agency justifica-
tions provide the foundation for most modern corporate governance 
reform, specifically, the assumptions that boards exist to monitor man-
agement and that independent directors are best-suited to do so. Part II 
asserts that regulations designed to improve board efficacy have adopted 
cosmetically independent directorships as the “magic bullet” of corporate 
governance reform; however, this move toward cosmetic independence 
is at best an incomplete response to corporate malfeasance and failure. 
By applying the insights of organizational behavior, Part III identifies 
three attributes: time, information, and knowledge, that are more impor-
tant to effective board monitoring than the cosmetic independence dis-
cussed in Part II, and argues that these three attributes, which contribute 
to substantive independence, should play a dominant role in determining 
board membership. A brief conclusion follows. 
                                                            
 13. Avoiding managerial capture is important for boards to be able to engage in effective moni-
toring. Yet cosmetic independence does not alleviate the problem of a captured board. It is likely that 
the potential for managerial capture still exists because of CEO and management’s influence over 
the director selection process. In the event that such capture is reduced or eliminated, there is a high 
likelihood that directors will be biased in favor of the interests of their fellow board members. Fair-
fax, supra note 8, at 157–59. For a discussion of in-group biases, see discussion infra at notes 61–72 
and accompanying text. 
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I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS AGENCY THEORY FOUNDATIONS 
The fundamental assumptions underlying the conception of the cor-
porate board and the numerous attempts to reform it can be traced to the 
seminal insights of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property.14 Berle and Means describe a sea 
change in how private property is owned and controlled.15 They detail 
the rise of the modern corporation, and their assumptions have informed 
much of the scholarly work on corporations in the decades that have fol-
lowed.16 The challenges created by the separation of ownership and con-
trol, which Berle and Means identify as the central concern of corporate 
governance, result in a divergence of the interests of shareholders and 
managers. This divergence means that since managers are no longer 
owners, they will not be motivated by a property owner’s “quest for prof-
its.”17 In other words, managers will no longer have a strong ownership 
interest to incentivize them to run the corporation profitably.18 Although 
there have been important changes to the ownership structure of the firm 
since The Modern Corporation and Private Property was first published, 
including less dispersed shareholders, the rise of the institutional inves-
tor, and an increase in management’s ownership interest due to equity-
based compensation, the concerns identified by Berle and Means contin-
ue to dominate corporate governance discourse.19 In particular, this dis-
course has largely framed the role of shareholders, managers, and direc-
tors in terms of agency theory. 
Under agency theory, shareholders are the firm’s owners and prin-
cipals, and corporate managers are the shareholders’ agents who control 
                                                            
 14. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 2010) (1932). 
 15. Id. at 8, 219. 
 16. William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 
737, 738 & n.5 (2001) (“Westlaw’s ‘JLR’ index shows citations of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property in 677 articles as of March 2001.”) Bratton notes that the database maintains its 
presence “somewhat crudely” Id. (citations omitted). Ten years later, the number of citations to 
Berle and Means has more than doubled. As of May 4, 2011, the database shows 1,561 citations 
when searching with Bratton’s search terms “berle /10 ‘modern corporation and private.’” 
 17. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 14, at 9. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional 
Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (2004) (“At the end of the third quarter of 2002, U.S. institutions 
held 49.8 percent of all U.S. equities . . . .”); Robert A.G. Monks, What Will Be the Impact of Active 
Shareholders? A Practical Recipe for Constructive Change, 32 LONG RANGE PLANNING 20, 20–21 
(1999) (Describing the “New Owners” of corporate securities as “the modern institutional investor 
who hold[s] more than 60% of the outstanding stock in the largest U.S. and U.K. companies.”). 
Equity-based compensation is a substantial portion of most senior executives’ compensation pack-
ages, which reduces the space between shareholder and manager observed by Berle and Means al-
most eighty years ago. 
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its day-to-day operations.20 Shareholders want the highest return on their 
investment—hence the common notion that a public corporation’s prima-
ry purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth.21 In order to maximize 
their wealth, shareholders must, among other things, keep agency costs 
to a minimum.22 But as the economic and legal literature exploring prin-
cipal–agent concerns illustrates, reducing agency costs is as important as 
it is challenging.23 
The agency problem, namely the misalignment of an agent and 
principal’s incentives, has received sustained academic attention.24 When 
the principal and agent’s interests are not aligned, the agent, like all eco-
nomically rational actors, will maximize her own interests at the expense 
                                                            
 20. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron’s Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered 
Questions, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2003) (stating that corporate officers act as agents of the 
corporation or its board of directors in the traditional principal–agent model).  
 21. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are 
to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to 
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”); Stephen 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, the Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
547, 563 (2003) (“[M]ost corporate law scholars some variant of shareholder primacy.”); Milton 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 
13, 1970, at 32, available at http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf (“[Corporate execu-
tives’] responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with [shareholders’] desires, which 
will generally be to make as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of socie-
ty, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”). There is a closely related 
corporate governance debate about who benefits from the board’s monitoring. The traditional view, 
consistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm, is that the board monitors managers to 
ensure that they are maximizing shareholder value. Another commonly accepted view is that the 
board is there to work toward stakeholder interests. The corporate social responsibility debate can be 
traced back to Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, who are often credited with being the original 
advocates of shareholder wealth maximization and stakeholder theory, respectively. See Adolf A. 
Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); E. Merrick 
Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1932).  
 22. Agency costs are the costs incurred when managers (agents) pursue interests that diverge 
from those of the principal. These costs can be expressed as the sum of monitoring and bonding 
costs plus the residual loss borne by principals to curb their agent’s shirking. Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 14. 
 23. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 248–49 (1999) (“This principal-agent model, in turn, has given rise to two recurring 
themes in the literature: First, that the central economic problem . . . is reducing agency costs . . . and 
second, that the primary goal of the public corporation is—or ought to be—maximizing sharehold-
er’s wealth.”); Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-
Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 188 (1997) (stating that reducing 
agency costs is the “most important and difficult challenge” of corporate law). 
 24. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 22, at 308 (“If both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of 
the principal.”). 
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of her principal. This results in the problem of managerial opportunism,25 
leading managers to be disloyal, to engage in rent-seeking behavior, and 
to shirk. Certain monitoring mechanisms are therefore necessary to re-
duce agency costs by ensuring that agents are truly working in the best 
interest of the principal. In the context of the corporation, these monitor-
ing mechanisms help to guarantee that the corporation’s officers are 
maximizing shareholder wealth. Accordingly, the corporation’s board of 
directors functions as an important monitoring mechanism in a publicly 
traded corporation,26 thereby giving the corporation a corporeal form 
through which it can affect its intentions.27 
In accordance with agency theory, many scholars assert that an ef-
fective board is critical to reducing managerial shirking and opportunism, 
thereby decreasing agency costs, increasing shareholder wealth, and pre-
venting corporate failure.28 Specifically, under agency theory, the corpo-
rate board of directors reduces these adverse effects through monitoring 
managers, which is considered its central function.29 The board performs 
this function by hiring, firing, and setting the compensation of the CEO 
                                                            
 25. Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International 
Securities Transactions, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 52 (describing managerial opportunism as 
the opportunity of agents in corporate organizations “to take advantage of their position and derive 
private benefits from ‘other people’s money’”). 
 26. See AM. L. INST. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 cmt. d (1992) (discussing the board of director’s “oversight function”). 
Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2003) (recognizing that when the principal’s rights and responsibili-
ties “are divided between the board of directors and the shareholders,” there is “a strong bias” to-
ward the board “as it relates to the running of the corporation’s affairs”) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–69 (1997); Paul E. Juras & 
Yvonne L. Hinson, Examining the Effect of Board Characteristics on Agency Costs and Selected 
Performance Measures in Banks, 7 ACAD. BANKING STUD. J. 87, 87 (2008). 
 27. Langevoort, supra note 26, at 1191 (“To animate and give the corporation a voice, corpo-
rate law recognizes the board of directors.”). 
 28. Blair & Stout, supra note 23; Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Direc-
tor, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 81 (2007); Fairfax, supra note 8, at 137; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
22, at 308–09; Juras & Hinson, supra note 26, at 89; Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Indepen-
dence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 457 (2008); James D. Westphal, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that the “func-
tion of boards is to reduce agency costs”) (1999). 
 29. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 599; Lynne L. Dallas, Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of 
Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 801 (2003); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social 
Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (1999) (“The managerial model of the board has now been 
supplanted by a monitoring model.”); Eugene F. Fama & Michael Jensen, The Separation of Owner-
ship and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 306 (1983) (asserting that the separation of decision man-
agement and decision control, the latter being controlled by the board, is necessary to protect resi-
dual claimants from opportunistic behavior on the part of decision agents (managers)); Donald C. 
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Conse-
quences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 802 (2001). 
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and other senior managerial executives.30 It also monitors managers by 
cleansing conflicts of interest between the corporation and top-level 
management.31 Finally, boards review management’s most important 
decisions, such as certain types of mergers or acquisitions.32 
II. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS: A POPULAR RESPONSE TO THE 
CORPORATION’S WOES 
Regulators have heavily focused on the monitoring function of 
boards, which is often thought of as the “minimal duty of every board.”33 
Reforms have assumed that an independent board is best-suited to per-
form the board’s monitoring tasks.34 Accordingly, increasing board inde-
pendence has been the standard regulatory response to the widely publi-
cized corporate scandals and failures of the recent past.35 Policymakers 
direct the bulk of their criticisms at the board of directors, and their solu-
tions are based on the perceived connection between proper board moni-
toring and better firm performance. This Part illustrates that reforms have 
                                                            
 30. Fama & Jensen, supra note 29, at 311 (noting that “boards always have the power to hire, 
fire, and compensate the top-level decision managers and to ratify and monitor important deci-
sions.”); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Under-
standing Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 
492 (1999). 
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2010). 
 32. Board approval in this context has been categorized as part of what some call the board’s 
control function, which is subsumed by the monitoring function. There is a significant amount of 
scholarship discussing whether the board actually exerts control over management’s decisions. The 
general consensus is that boards do not exercise this control well. Richard Saliterman, has stated: 
The corporation, for the most part, has been and presently is governed by a highly theo-
retical and, arguably, a non-reality oriented framework of perceptions: 1) that sharehold-
ers—the principal corporate investors—control the corporations and reflect their share-
holder sovereignty by electing boards of directors; and 2) that these boards of directors 
select or otherwise carefully govern the activities of corporate executives who are subser-
vient to both the board and the shareholders. 
Richard Saliterman, Perceptions Bearing on the Public Policy Dynamics of Corporation Law, 20 
HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 261 (1996). 
 33. COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD 50–51, 67–68 
(2003); James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside 
Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2003) (noting that the “central 
task” of outside directors “is to monitor the performance of senior management, most particularly 
the chief executive officer (CEO)”). For an in-depth analysis of the monitoring model of the board, 
see Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Pub-
lic Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 673–77 (2004). 
 34. Ribstein, supra note 9, at 11. 
 35. Improving independence is not the only response to corporate failure. For a discussion of 
the response to and problems with the regulatory approach to corporate fraud, see Ribstein, supra 
note 9, at 11–18 (describing regulatory responses to corporate fraud including those found in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act such as director independence, whistleblower protection, audit committee re-
forms, and executive compensation). 
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responded to corporate failure with measures designed to strengthen the 
board’s independence. 
A. Independence as a Cure-All 
The prevailing wisdom is that the boards that are best-suited to 
monitor management are those that are independent from management.36 
Current best practices of corporate governance articulate several criteria 
for the ideal corporate board of directors. This list includes many con-
cepts familiar to corporate governance scholars: individual directors 
should be independent; the core committees (audit, compensation, and 
nomination) should be made up of independent directors;37 boards should 
hold an executive session during which the independent directors meet 
without any inside directors, including the CEO; boards should be as 
small as practicable; and director compensation should have an equity-
based component to better align directors’ interests with shareholders’ 
interests.38 Underlying each solution is the assumption that independent 
directors, meaning those that do not have material ties to the company on 
                                                            
 36. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of the 
Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 866 (2010) (describing the modern 
model of the corporation, which includes an independent board that should be “an effective monitor 
of management performance”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1540 
(2007) (The board’s added responsibilities for “the monitoring of financial controls and disclosure” 
has led “to more rigorous standards of director independence.”); Note, Beyond “Independent” Di-
rectors: A Functional Approach to Board Independence, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1553, 1560–61 (2006) 
(arguing “that effective corporate governance” depends “on the independent behavior of the board as 
a unit”). This Essay criticizes cosmetic independence or independence in name only. It agrees that a 
board needs to have substantive independence from managerial influence in order to engage in effec-
tive monitoring. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 37. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (2006) (stating that, in general, each member of the audit 
committee of the issuer must be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and must otherwise 
be independent). NASDAQ requires that independent directors provide oversight of execution com-
pensation. See NASDAQ QUALIFICATION, supra note 10, at IM-5605-6. “Director nominees must 
either be selected or recommended for the Board’s selection, either by: (A) Independent Directors 
constituting a majority of the Board’s Independent Directors in a vote in which only Independent 
Directors participate, or (B) a nominations committee comprised solely of Independent Directors.” 
Id. at IM-5605(e)(1) (2009). Audit committee responsibilities and authority are described id. at IM-
5605(c) (2009). NYSE rules require that “listed companies have a nominating/corporate governance 
committee composed entirely of independent directors.” NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL supra 
note 10, § 303A.04. Furthermore, “listed companies must have a compensation committee composed 
entirely of independent directors.” Id. § 303A.05. 
 38. CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 33, at 42; Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 562 (noting that in 
the 1980s and 1990s, a trend emerged that sought to align the interests of directors and shareholders 
by paying directors with company stock); R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Op-
portunities: Creating a Culture of Greater Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 
829, 841 (2003); see Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured 
Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1996) (noting that making 
equity a part of director compensation aligns their interests more closely with those of shareholders). 
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whose board they sit, through an employment, familial, or investment 
relationship, will not be captured by management and will effectively 
safeguard the company’s assets, so that the assets are used to maximize 
shareholder wealth. This basic assumption has been the foundation of 
many of the corporate governance reforms that have shaped the modern 
corporate landscape. 
As with the reforms that followed the Penn Central Railroad col-
lapse39 and the savings and loan crisis,40 reforms after scandals such as 
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom41 were meant to restore investor confidence 
in the financial integrity of the stock market. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX) directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
“undertake rulemaking in a number of areas, including mandatory listing 
standards to be adopted by self-regulatory organizations (SROs).”42 
Many of the SEC’s and SROs’ reforms formalized the assumption that 
board independence would reduce executive mismanagement, and that 
proper oversight from an independent board would decrease the likelih-
                                                            
 39. For a description of the Penn Central Railroad collapse and the rise of the monitoring 
board, see Gordon, supra note 36, at 1515–19. Gordon describes the directors of Penn Central Rail-
road as unaware of the financial trouble that resulted in the company’s collapse. Id. at 1515. For 
instance, “in the two years before the collapse, the board []approved over $100 million in divi-
dends. . . . [The directors] had been neither advisors nor monitors, but figureheads.” Id. at 1516. The 
failure of the “advisory board model” led to a “reconceptualization of the board,” which is the moni-
toring model. Id. at 1518.  
 40. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006)) (regulating employee benefit plans, includ-
ing pension plans); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)).  
 41. See Alexi Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/business/businessspecial3/ 
26enron.html (a jury found that former Enron chief executives Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling lied to 
“investors, employees, and regulators” in an attempt to hide the troubled financial situation of the 
corporation); Ken Belson, Adelphia Proposes to Settle Federal Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E5D81639F93AA15751C1A9629C8B63 
(Adelphia Communications Corp., some employees, and members of the family that founded Adel-
phia were “accused of securities fraud and improper accounting”; the company declared bankruptcy 
in 2002); Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses Inflating Cash Flow 
$3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/26/business/worldcom-
says-it-hid-expenses-inflating-cash-flow-3.8-billion.html (stating that at its peak in June 1999, 
WorldCom had a value of $115.3 billion, but by June 2002 it was worth less than $1 billion after an 
internal audit revealed its cash flow was inflated by over $3.8 billion); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Alex 
Berenson, Corporate Conduct: The Overview: Tyco Admits Using Accounting Tactics to Inflate 
Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/31/business/corporate-
conduct-overview-tyco-admits-using-accounting-tricks-inflate-earnings.html (after admitting that it 
had employed “financial gimmickry” to inflate its earnings, Tyco agreed to “erase $382 million in 
profits it had previously claimed.”). 
 42. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, Ex-
change Act Release No. 4875, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,175 (Nov. 12, 2003). 
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ood of future corporate failure.43 Subsequently, the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotations (NASDAQ) enacted rules that were, in significant part, 
“aimed to ensure the independence of directors of listed companies.”44 
Specifically, the new requirements stated that all listing companies must 
have boards made up of a majority of independent directors, with a stric-
ter standard of what constituted “independence.”45 Moreover, the ex-
changes also required that the non-management directors of listed com-
panies regularly hold executive sessions during which directors would 
meet without management.46 The listing agencies also adopted rules tar-
geting the structure of the board of directors by requiring that the nomi-
nating or corporate governance, compensation, and audit committees be 
staffed only by independent directors.47 
Like the reforms of years past, the most recent round of corporate 
governance reforms, enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, seemingly 
embrace independence as a solution to the agency cost problems in the 
publicly traded corporation.48 For instance, section 10C emphasizes the 
                                                            
 43. See SEC, Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, S7-02-03 (Apr. 10, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm: 
As directed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we are adopting a new rule to direct the 
national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of 
any security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the audit committee requirements 
mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. These requirements relate to: the indepen-
dence of audit committee members; the audit committee’s responsibility to select and 
oversee the issuer’s independent accountant; procedures for handling complaints regard-
ing the issuer’s accounting practices; the authority of the audit committee to engage advi-
sors; and funding for the independent auditor and any outside advisors engaged by the 
audit committee. 
Id. at 1. 
 44. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 64,154, 64,176–78 (referring to the NYSE changes—the NASDAQ changes described mirror 
those of the NYSE); see also NASDAQ QUALIFICATION, supra note 10, at IM-5605; NYSE LISTED 
COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 10, §§ 303A.01 & 303A.02 (2011). 
 45. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. 
Reg. at 64,157. 
 46. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 
at 64,158 (requiring that the independent directors hold an executive session and that certain deci-
sions be made by only independent directors or by a majority of independent directors); see also 
NASDAQ QUALIFICATION, supra note 10, at 4350(c)(4)(A); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, 
supra note 10, § 303A.0.4. 
 47. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 
at 64,158–59. 
 48. This Essay does not provide an exhaustive account or treatment of the corporate gover-
nance reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, § 111(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–94 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5321) (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council); § 152(a), 124 Stat. at 1413 (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5342) (establishing the Office of Financial Research); § 204, 124 Stat. at 
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value of an independent board. It provides that within 360 days after the 
bill is enacted,49 “the SEC must issue rules directing the national securi-
ties exchanges to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that does 
not have an independent compensation committee.”50 The reforms reflect 
the assumption that the directors who are best-suited to monitor manag-
ers are those that do not have strong economic or familial ties to the 
company. In the year immediately preceding the 2008 financial crisis, the 
average board of the Fortune 1000 had two inside directors and eight 
outside directors.51 This is a dramatic difference from 1950, when ap-
proximately fifty percent of the board was made up of outsiders.52 The 
more significant change extends beyond merely shifting the ratio of in-
siders to outsiders to the increase in unaffiliated, independent directors. 
This shift is even more dramatic, with a change from around twenty per-
cent in 1950 to approximately seventy-five percent fifty-five years lat-
er.53 But these changes, like those that have come before, are incomplete. 
Despite the fact that independent boards are ubiquitous, there are still 
recurring instances of widespread corporate failure. 
B. Limitations on Independence 
While altering board composition has been a popular regulatory re-
sponse to many corporate scandals and financial failures,54 recent re-
search has raised doubts about its efficacy.55 Empirical studies have 
                                                                                                                                     
1454–56 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384); § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964–65 (to be codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5491) (establishing the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection). 
 49. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 10C(f)(1), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j–3). 
 50. Id. § 10C, 124 Stat. at 1900–03. 
 51. KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY, app. A (2008); see also 
Sydney Finkelstein & Ann C. Mooney, Not the Usual Suspects: How to Use Board Process to Make 
Boards Better, 17 ACAD. MGMT. 101, 101 (2003) (finding that “outsiders now account for seventy-
five percent of directors on the average board” of the S&P 500). 
 52. Gordon, supra note 36, at 1473. 
 53. Id. at 1475. 
 54. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate 
Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 855–56 (2003) (observing that the collapse of 
Enron and other corporate scandals was “a watershed moment in U.S. corporate governance.” The 
perceived monitoring failure by Enron’s board resulted in a “dramatic change in approach to corpo-
rate board composition, conduct, and responsibility . . . at the legal and regulatory levels”). See supra 
note 9. 
 55. M. Bednar & James D. Westphal, Pluralistic Ignorance in Corporate Boards and Firms’ 
Strategic Persistence in Response to Low Firm Performance, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 262, 263 (2005) 
(“Yet there is considerable qualitative and anecdotal evidence that boards often fail to check execu-
tives’ tendencies to persist with failing strategies, regardless of the number of outside directors on 
the board.”); see, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Inde-
pendence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002) (finding that firms with 
more independent boards do not perform better than other firms); see also Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard 
Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. 
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yielded contradictory conclusions demonstrating the lack of consensus 
on the efficacy of such changes. Some scholars have asserted that direc-
tors lack the time, information, and knowledge to properly perform their 
monitoring task.56 In his 1971 book Directors: Myth and Reality, Myles 
Mace, a vocal critic of outside directors, found that outside directors 
were not appointed for the substantive contributions they could make to 
the company, but for the prestige value they added.57 Mace was skeptical 
as to whether outside directors, who were mostly nominated by the pres-
ident and CEO, would meaningfully challenge management.58 Directors 
were seen as the servants of managers, not shareholders. Additionally, 
directors lacked the time and motivation to properly understand the com-
pany, being occupied in demanding full-time jobs elsewhere.59 Mace’s 
criticism, similar to those of Lorsch and MacIver, who thought indepen-
dent directors were more accurately labeled pawns rather than potentates, 
have found support with many scholars in decades since his book was 
first published.60 
Whether a director can ever truly be independent has also been 
called into question. Studies have found that outside, unaffiliated direc-
tors often lack independence from the CEO for various reasons. As a 
                                                                                                                                     
LAW. 921, 922 (1999) (presenting evidence that overall firm performance was not correlated to the 
composition of the board and that “[i]ndependent directors often turn out to be lapdogs rather than 
watchdogs”); Dan R. Dalton et al., Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Struc-
ture, and Financial Performance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269, 278 (1998) (finding “little support 
for a systematic relationship” between “board composition and financial performance”); Finkelstein 
& Mooney, supra note 51, at 102 (studying the relationship of several indicia of board independence 
to shareholder returns and finding that there was “no significant difference in the number of outsid-
ers, director shareholdings, board size, and CEO duality” between the firms that performed in the 
upper quartile of the S&P 500 and those that performed in the lower quartile). See generally John A. 
Wagner III, J. L. Stimpert & Edward I. Fubara, Board Composition and Organizational Perfor-
mance: Two Studies of Insider/Outsider Effects, 35 J. MGMT. STUDIES 655, 655 (1998) (“[The re-
sults] suggest the existence of a curvilinear homogeneity effect in which performance is enhanced by 
the greater relative presence of either inside or outside directors.”).  
 56. JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF 
AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 84–88 (1989); Fairfax, supra note 8, at 161–67 (discussing the 
information asymmetries and knowledge deficit that confront outside directors and consequently 
limit their efficacy). 
 57. MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 107 (1971). 
 58. Id. at 108. 
 59. Id. at 107, 109. 
 60. LORSCH WITH MACIVER, supra note 56; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors 
and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1058–59 (1993); Victor 
Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 
611–21 (1982); Fairfax, supra note 8 (questing the trend toward independent directors, arguing that 
their value has been overstated because their ability to perform their monitoring function is con-
strained, whereas inside directors may offer valuable contributions to the board); Ribstein, supra 
note 9, at 26; Rodrigues, supra note 28 (criticizing current regulations’ overemphasis on indepen-
dence). 
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general matter, criticism of board independence can be divided into two 
categories: psychological limitations on independence and practical limi-
tations on independence. 
Director independence is subject to psychological limitations as a 
result of the group dynamics in the boardroom, including norms, struc-
tural bias, and “groupthink.” The social dynamic of board meetings and 
boardroom norms often mean that board members are unwilling to con-
tradict the CEO.61 In addition to the norms, directors have self-interested 
reasons for not voicing their disapproval. CEOs frequently nominate 
candidates for an outside directorship, which means that many directors 
fear they will not be reappointed if they contradict or alienate the CEO.62 
It also means that many board members feel obligated to support the 
CEOs who supported their appointment.63 Additionally, structural bias 
and groupthink may constrain director’s independent judgment.64 Studies 
of structural bias indicate that independent directors cannot be seen as a 
panacea to the problems facing corporate boards because no director re-
mains independent for long.65 Chief among the reasons for structural bias 
is that board members form close relationships that make it unlikely that 
a director will voice an opinion that runs contrary to the position taken 
by the majority of other board members.66 Directors value their close 
relationships and will work to maintain them even at the expense of op-
timal decision-making. Therefore, structural bias limits a director’s criti-
cal assessment of the CEO or her proposals.67 
                                                            
 61. LORSCH WITH MACIVER, supra note 56, at 92–93. 
 62. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 158 (noting that not only do “studies reveal that CEOs often domi-
nate the director-nomination process, causing directors to feel beholden to the CEOs” but they also 
reveal that directors feel “beholden to their fellow directors because those directors nominated 
them”); Paul Hempel & Charles Fey, Outside Director Compensation and Firm Performance, 33 
HUM. RES. MGMT. 111, 113 (1994). 
 63. Westphal, supra note 8, at 8. 
 64. For a more detailed discussion of structural bias, see James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, 
Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 
48 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and 
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2006); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substan-
tive Review, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 821 (2004). 
 65. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of 
Director Independence, 90 IOWA. L. REV. 1305, 1308 (2005); Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and 
the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 239–40. 
 66. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 64, at 852–53; Velasco, supra note 64, at 824. 
 67. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050–51 (Del. 2004) (“[Structural bias] presupposes that 
the professional and social relationships that naturally develop among members of a board impede 
independent decisionmaking.”); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 
2003) (while the opinion does not use the term “structural bias,” it does discuss bias-creating rela-
tionships and identifies “motives like love, friendship, and collegiality” as influential in decision-
making). 
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Whereas structural bias has been most often discussed in the con-
text of special litigation committees, which are used to terminate deriva-
tive suits,68 another form of in-group bias, groupthink, can be even more 
pervasive on boards. Groupthink further reduces the likelihood that even 
an independent director will be willing to express dissenting opinions. 
Groupthink occurs when a board’s decision-making is subconsciously 
influenced by boardroom norms, especially in situations where directors 
form a cohesive group that is working toward consensus decision-
making.69 While scholars disagree on the effects of groupthink on the 
decision-making capabilities of corporate boards, the downside of group-
think is that boards are less likely to individually analyze the decisions 
they are asked to make. In other words, groups engaged in groupthink 
make poor judgments because they allow their desire for unanimity to 
reduce the quality of their decision-making.70 Although there are signifi-
cant negatives to groupthink, a few authors have concluded that strong 
group cohesion can be positive or negative depending on other circums-
tances.71 Nevertheless, there is some consensus that groupthink limits the 
board’s independence for purposes of monitoring.72 
Independent directors are practically limited in their ability to ef-
fectively monitor boards because they are at a time, information, and 
knowledge disadvantage relative to the managers they monitor. The re-
mainder of this Essay explores the practical limitations that must be re-
medied for boards to engage in effective monitoring. It is important to 
note, however, that the practical limitations discussed below and psycho-
logical limitations mentioned above are not binary categories. Increased 
time, information, and knowledge can help directors to think individual-
ly, thereby reducing the impact of structural bias and their propensity to 
                                                            
 68. Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 1059. 
 69. For a more detailed discussion of groupthink, see Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: 
The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003); see also IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF 
GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1972); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV 1, 32 (2002). 
 70. See Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 32; see also O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1238–39 (noting 
that the quest for unanimity affects decision-making by impeding “critical reflection and reality 
testing”). 
 71. Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Under-
standing Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 
496–97 (1999) (finding that group cohesiveness can have positive effects on group decision-making 
unless the group also experiences self-censure and pressure). 
 72. Empirical research has emphasized that close social ties can provide greater board in-
volvement in their advisor/counselor roles, though it may not have as positive an effect on their 
monitoring role. Westphal, supra note 8, at 9. 
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engage in groupthink.73 Focusing on process-oriented approaches as dis-
cussed below can reduce the harmful cohesion that engenders in-group 
biases through fostering an atmosphere that promotes multiple view-
points while maintaining collegiality.74 
III. BEYOND COSMETIC INDEPENDENCE—AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAVIOR APPROACH 
The organizational behavior literature that studies effective deci-
sion-making teams identifies attributes that exert greater influence on the 
board’s decision-making ability than “independence,”75 and thereby the 
board’s ability to effectively monitor managers. Companies continue to 
fail despite the ubiquity of the majority-independent board, in large part 
because the board lacks three critical components for successful monitor-
ing: time, information, and knowledge.76 For instance, the boards of For-
tune’s 2001 list of the most-admired and least-admired companies had 
similar governance practices and characteristics.77 In other words, both 
corporate failures and successes have independent directors and commit-
tee structures. Many factors contribute to corporate failure.78 But revisit-
ing the who of the board from an organizational behavior perspective 
offers valuable insights that may be able to help slow or deter some of 
                                                            
 73. According to Janis, faulty structure is an antecedent condition to groupthink. Each of the 
three attributes discussed in this Essay are improvements to the current structural flaws present in 
most boards, hence they make it less likely that a board will be susceptible to groupthink. See JANIS, 
supra note 69, at 243–45; O’Connor, supra note 69, at 1265–66 (applying Janis’s work to the Enron 
board and discussing inadequate decision-making procedures). 
 74. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 75. G. Tyge Payne, George S. Benson & David L. Finegold, Corporate Board Attributes, Team 
Effectiveness and Financial Performance, 46 J. MGMT. STUDIES 704, 708 (2009). 
 76. In addition to the three attributes of time, knowledge, and information discussed in this 
Essay, the literature often identifies the power of the group to reach independent decisions and in-
centives to align the interests of the board with those of the shareholders. See Payne et al., supra note 
75, at 708. The balance of power between the CEO and management is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. Aligning directors’ incentives with the shareholders has inspired another popular category of 
reforms, namely those that advocate equity-based compensation for directors. See discussion supra 
note 38 and accompanying text. 
 77. Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great: It’s Not Rules and Regulations. 
It’s the Way People Work Together, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 107 (2002). 
 78. John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Rele-
vant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) (rejecting arguments that a lack of independence caused 
the corporate scandals that occurred in 2001–2002; arguing that boards were more independent 
during 2001–2002 than they were in previous periods, and such independence did not prevent sever-
al high profile scandals; and arguing that an alternative explanation is “that the gatekeepers failed”); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 269, 304–305 (2004) (suggesting the post-Enron NYSE and NASDAQ reforms 
regarding independence standards would not have affected the boards of Enron or WorldCom; ar-
guing that SOX failed to address key drivers of corporate malfeasance such as perverse incentives, 
structural conflicts, and gatekeeper failure). 
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the problems plaguing many modern corporations. More importantly, 
identifying and using inputs that create effective teams is an antecedent 
condition to boards implementing better decision-making processes, and 
thus contributing to higher-performing corporations.79 
Organizational behavior scholars have noted that boards are similar 
to other decision-making teams within organizations.80 Like most teams, 
there is a connection between a board’s attributes, its effectiveness, and 
ultimately the outcomes it produces.81 Perhaps most importantly, con-
trasting these team-oriented attributes supported by an organizational 
behavior approach with the conventional focus on cosmetic indepen-
dence indicates that the conventional approach does not provide an ade-
quate solution to corporate failure. The contemporary model of corporate 
governance reform has assumed that if the definition of independence is 
changed to include more observable traits of independence, firms will 
perform better. The empirical evidence described in the preceding Part 
indicates otherwise.82 
While studying board characteristics and their connection to firm 
performance is a difficult task, it is clear that there is something missing 
between the regulatory inputs and their desired outcomes. Through fo-
cusing on the components necessary for individuals and groups to make 
sound decisions and perform their roles well, organizational behavior 
argues that directors need time, information, and knowledge in order to 
properly evaluate the recommendations and decisions of management. 
Similarly, processes that strengthen these three attributes are critical to 
the success of corporate boards and the firms that they serve. Each of 
these three components can simultaneously be a limiting and enabling 
factor for board success.83 Stated differently, improve one of the three 
components and a board is likely to perform better. Diminish one and the 
board will perform worse. A board that possesses these characteristics is 
likely to be more proactive, and less reactive, in performing its duties. 
Cosmetic independence can reduce the board’s ability to effectively 
monitor managers because it limits time, information, and knowledge. 
                                                            
 79. Payne et al., supra note 75, at 719 (finding that “knowledge, information, power, and op-
portunity/time[] were significantly related to board effectiveness,” which is a strong predictor of a 
corporation’s financial performance); Sharpe, supra note 1. 
 80. Payne et al., supra note 75, at 707 (“Corporate boards are defined groups of individuals 
who each bring unique skills and backgrounds along with their own personal interests and agendas, 
but must work together interdependently to achieve common goals.”); Forbes & Milliken, supra note 
71, at 491–92 (noting that although boards differ from other work groups, group decision-making 
literature is still instructive; writing that “boards of directors can be characterized as large, elite, and 
episodic decisionmaking groups that face complex tasks pertaining to strategic-issue processing”). 
 81. Payne et al., supra note 75, at 707. 
 82. See discussion supra at note 55. 
 83. Payne et al., supra note 75, at 708. 
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A. Time 
Many boards lack the time necessary to fulfill their monitoring ob-
ligations and oversee management.84 The lack of time that boards face is 
a problem because a board cannot perform its oversight function if it 
does not have complete information in a timely manner, and the time to 
review and understand it.85 Currently directors hold an average of eight 
meetings per year in addition to any other committee meetings they may 
have.86 The realities of independent-director life mean that in increasing 
any of the attributes of effective decision-making, we must consider how 
much time a part-time director can actually devote to increasing her 
knowledge or obtaining the best types of information to do her job. Di-
rectors are usually officers of other companies, and acting as a director 
occupies only a small fraction of any given director’s time.87 On average, 
directors spend less than sixteen hours a month on board-related work, 
including the time it takes to travel to and from board meetings.88 In 
these meetings, the directors are responsible for monitoring management 
through reviewing the corporation’s financial statements, approving 
committee reports, and possibly approving major strategic decisions. Re-
cent regulations, such as SOX, impose added requirements for regulatory 
compliance, which increase the responsibilities of the board members 
and put even greater pressure on their time.89 
B. Information 
In order to perform their monitoring task well, boards need infor-
mation about how the company is operating and being managed.90 Addi-
tionally, boards need information about the competitive environment in 
which the company operates, such as intelligence on competitors and the 
business environment.91 Yet the information board members are provided 
                                                            
 84. CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 33, at 73. 
 85. Sonnenfeld, supra note 77, at 109. 
 86. KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 51, at 10. The boards of American companies meet an 
average of eight times per year not including telephonic meetings. Id. Two decades ago the 
Korn/Ferry survey showed twenty-five percent of American companies held monthly board meet-
ings. Id. That number dropped to nine percent of surveyed American companies in 2003, and by 
2007, only seven percent met monthly. Id. 
 87. Id. at 4–5. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Jay W. Lorsch & Robert C. Clark, Leading from the Boardroom, 86 HARV. BUS. REV. 104, 
107 (2008) (writing that “since the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley, in 2002, for instance, the time 
required for audit committee meetings has at least doubled.” As a result, “The directors’ committee 
work usually cannot be completed in the allotted time, and their discussions often end up being 
truncated or spilling over into hastily arranged teleconferences.”). 
 90. Payne et al., supra note 75, at 710. 
 91. Id. 
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is insufficient and does not prepare them to properly perform their moni-
toring role. Directors typically receive their information packets shortly 
before board meetings, and those packets are often voluminous and poor-
ly organized.92 Most of the data is backward looking and constitutes 
nothing more than lagging indicators of firm performance.93 Frequently 
the information is limited in scope to financial data, as opposed to the 
competitive, strategic, product, employee, or customer information the 
board needs to properly evaluate management and their strategies.94 
Moreover, directors receive information packets prepared by the CEO or 
by the executives who work for her; directors rarely have channels out-
side of the CEO for information gathering.95 If executive management’s 
vision of the company is flawed, the board’s information will share the 
same flaws.96 Not surprisingly, many directors believe that they do not 
have the right information to assess the costs and benefits of particular 
courses of action before they must vote to approve that action.97 Thus, 
critics of the information-dissemination system that exists at most corpo-
rations rightly argue that directors have neither the correct information 
nor the time to assimilate the information they are given. As a result, di-
rectors often must review and approve complex issues without a suffi-
cient understanding of the context in which the issues occur, which in-
                                                            
 92. CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 33, at 27; see also David A. Nadler, Building Better 
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directors a phone-book-size report that includes, buried in a thicket of subclauses and footnotes, the 
news that earnings are off for the second consecutive quarter? Surely not a CEO who trusts his or her 
board. Yet this destructive, dangerous pattern happens all the time.” Id. 
 93. Nadler, supra note 92, at 110. 
 94. CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 33, at 27. 
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breaching their duty of care, directors “have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business 
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“relevant and timely information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the board’s supervisory 
and monitoring role under Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.” 698 A.2d 959, 
970 (Del. Ch. 1996). Additionally, boards of directors have a right to rely on the information of 
third-party gatekeepers, such as attorneys and outside consultants. These third parties do not reduce 
the reliance on the CEO; because they obtain their information from corporate insiders, they often 
have their own conflicts of interest that increase the likelihood that they will go along with manage-
ment’s recommendations, and they may suffer from some of the same in-group biases as the board 
itself. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 162. Thus, the prevailing wisdom is that directors are generally li-
mited to information provided by the CEO and her team. See Nadler, supra note 92, at 110. 
 96. CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 33, at 46. 
 97. Nadler, supra note 92, at 110. 
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cludes the underlying assumptions that affect the outcome of the board’s 
decision.98 
C. Knowledge 
Even if directors had the appropriate information, being able to 
comprehend the information is a more difficult task that requires in-depth 
knowledge about the firm. A director’s relevant knowledge can be classi-
fied in two ways: knowledge about functional business areas, such as 
marketing or accounting, or knowledge that is firm-specific.99 Most di-
rectors are knowledgeable business people; however, they lack know-
ledge about the company on whose board they sit and the industry within 
which that company operates.100 A lack of knowledge about the particu-
lar company means that independent directors cannot properly evaluate 
or meaningfully challenge the decisions they are asked to approve.101 The 
very definition of independence usually means that directors do not have 
a current or recent relationship with the company or any of its competi-
tors.102 Consequently, directors develop their company-specific know-
ledge as part of their work on the board, which can take years given the 
limited time they spend on board service.103 One recent survey found that 
directors who had long tenures on particular corporate boards still felt as 
though they did not “really understand how their companies make mon-
ey.”104 A Boston Consulting Group/Harvard Business School survey of 
132 CEOs in 2001 found that only half of North American CEOs be-
lieved their boards were well-prepared at meetings.105 The same survey 
showed that CEOs question whether directors are knowledgeable enough 
about the business to approve strategic decisions or evaluate their com-
pany’s performance.106 
The pervasive lack of knowledge most directors face reduces their 
efficacy in many ways. Directors recognize their ignorance and are often 
reluctant to voice their opinions in board meetings.107 One reason for this 
reluctance is that directors care about their image and do not want to ap-
                                                            
 98. LORSCH WITH MACIVER, supra note 60, at 58. 
 99. Forbes & Milliken, supra note 71, at 495. 
 100. CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 33, at 45; Fairfax, supra note 8, at 165. 
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 103. Id. 
 104. Nadler, supra note 92, at 110. 
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 106. Id. at 24 (citing a Boston Consulting Group/Harvard Business School Global Survey of 
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pear uniformed in front of their peers.108 Consequently, the type of open 
and honest discourse necessary to properly evaluate management’s deci-
sions is limited. As a result, the board’s ability to monitor is constrained. 
D. Beyond Cosmetic Independence 
The aforementioned problems intrinsic to cosmetic independence 
are an indication that corporate governance reform needs a new ap-
proach. The conventional model operates on an assumption that if a par-
ticular input is added (i.e., more independent directors), a specific output 
will follow (i.e., firms that are less likely to fail and have better market 
performance). In light of the attributes of effective teams, adding more 
independent directors and committees composed of independent direc-
tors is not likely to improve firm performance. At best, cosmetic inde-
pendence is an inadequate criterion for board membership. At worst, it 
impedes the board’s ability to perform the actual work of monitoring. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has identified problems with selection criteria for corpo-
rate directors. To address the problems, I have looked to the group deci-
sion-making literature within organizational behavior. This literature 
identifies three of the essential attributes of effective teams: time, infor-
mation, and knowledge. These attributes are necessary for boards to 
move beyond cosmetic independence to where directors, and the boards 
on which they serve, are free from significant managerial influence. Im-
proving corporate boards is a complex problem, but it is critical that we 
reexamine conventional assumptions in order to engage that complexity 
and, ultimately, improve board efficacy. The study of organizational be-
havior, with its focus on effective team decision-making, would greatly 
assist us in achieving this goal. 
Although this Essay focuses on the qualifications of board member-
ship and asserts that it influences how boards function, I am not arguing 
that it is the only factor that does so. In a separate and more detailed ex-
ploration of the issues raised in this Essay, I have asserted that the 
processes by which corporate boards gather information and make deci-
sions are equally if not more important than who sits on them.109 Never-
theless, to the extent that regulation continues to emphasize changes to 
the characteristics of the board, policymakers should adopt better selec-
tion criteria for directors. In my view, they should emphasize substantive 
characteristics over merely cosmetic ones. 
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